Contents:
 

The Party and the Trade Unions:
A general Outline of the Party's activity in the Trade Unions
 

The positions which the party expresses with regard to the trade unions are of the nature of principle and concern the necessity for the presence of large organisations of an economic character which are open to all wage-earners.

Via its fraction organised at the inside, the party aims to acquire a decisive influence over the unions, and in the revolutionary phase, even to take control of them. In such a way, the link between party and class is established (the transmission belt), through which the party can exercise its defining function; that of guide and leader of the revolutionary movement.

The conquering of such influence over the intermediate proletarian organizations is achieved by showing that the party line is the most coherent and consistent in defending working class interests, in contrast with the positions of other political movements within the union (reformists, anarchists, syndicalists etc.), against whom a political battle is carried out. Actual experience will be needed to convince proletarians of this.

The organisations we are talking about are of a purely economic character, the trade unions, and the party has always staunchly maintained, flying in the face of those who have abandoned them, that they have a crucial function. Other types of intermediate organization, of a political character, such as councils and soviets, may become necessary around the time of the conquest of power.

So far we have been dealing with questions of principle. But how do we assess the trade unions of the present day? What is our attitude towards them, and how does the party decide what tactics to adopt in different situations? In these matters Party activity in the unions is directly linked to its interpretation of the facts and its evaluation of the particular circumstances; and though approximations occur, experience and further study will continue to prompt further precisions and rectifications.

What needs to be taken into consideration, first of all, are the differences between one country and another with regard to the history of the formation of proletarian organisations, their different organisational characteristics, their procedures, and the different political positions which have inspired them during the many battles, won and lost, which have been fought by the proletariat. For example, a very real distinction exists between Anglo-Saxon “trade unionism” and the industrial syndicalism of French and Italian industry. The party's evaluation of the present day trade-unions, and the tactics which it follows, are therefore unlikely to be the same for all countries under all circumstances.

The party line of not organising within the CGIL (the main union federation in Italy) anymore, and supporting the reconstruction of the class union “outside and against the regime trade union”, is not a general principle of party action, but the result of an evaluation of the emerging situation in Italy; it may still require some fine tuning, or even alteration should a different situation require a change of tactics. First of all we need to draw a distinction. Lenin was right to lash out at the extremists for forming “revolutionary” unions, since such a tactic meant abandoning the masses who remained in the social-democratic unions to the influence of the counterrevolutionary leaders, the agents of the bourgeoisie. As he stated in Left-wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder, communists must work even in the most reactionary unions, with the aim, when circumstances permit, of taking control of them, and kicking out the old leaders and overturning their policies.

But it is important to distinguish between “reactionary unions” and what we term “regime unions”. The former are workers' unions led by “chauvinists and opportunists, often directly or indirectly linked to the bourgeoisie and to the police”, as Lenin put it. Such leaders will adopt policies designed to sabotage workers' struggles, and will intervene mainly to prevent them from progressing in a classist and revolutionary direction. Nevertheless, such unions retain a workers' identity, they are useful for, and used for, class struggle. Also, there exist possibilities for communist workers to organise within them and agitate for communist demands. Such organisations remain susceptible, under favourable circumstances, to being won over to class action and to being conquered by the party.

Thus may be characterised the CGL in Italy before the advent of fascism. After this organisation had been destroyed by the fascist gangs and the State police, the bourgeoisie didn't leave a vacuum: it formed the “fascist” union, a regime union, a direct emanation of the State. This is a union which workers are forced to join, which is organised from above, and which is impenetrable to classist directives. Its inalienable principle is social collaboration according to the principles of fascist corporatism, which also forbids, in its very statutes, access to communists. This organisation, despite the fact that in certain cases it showed it could take a stand in defence of workers' interests (of which more later) is no longer a real workers' union, and the party's advice is not to organise within it.

The CGIL (the additional “I” is for “Italian”) which was reconstructed after the 2nd World War was declared by the party to be the “heir of fascism unionism” and “modelled on Mussolini's blueprint”. Indeed it, too, was a direct emanation of the regime, as it amply demonstrated by suppressing the workers' attempts to organize in a red, classist way. Nevertheless, there were requirements, linked to the sales-patter of the democrats and the mystification of anti-fascism, which made such a union reclaim, in a formal sense anyway, the tradition of the ex-CGL, with which the majority of workers still identified. The working masses in Italy considered the CGIL to be their, red, combative union. This allowed the Party to organise within it, to fight for the principles of the anti-capitalist class struggle, and show the workers that the union needed to “return” to class politics. It would even try to capture base organisations like the “chambers of labour” (territorial organizations) and the “internal commissions” (factory organizations).

Even at that time, however, we still posed another possibility: the reconstruction, “ex novo”, of the class union. At the time it was impossible to predict which of the two eventualities history would endorse.

Over subsequent years, from the post-war period to the present, we have witnessed the CGIL progressively abandon not only any vestige of class politics, but, yet more seriously, any claim to be organizing itself into a class union, even in a formal sense.

There have been the mergers with the CISL and the UIL, both unions of scissionist origin formed to suit the bosses' requirements, and the introduction of the scheme whereby the employers collect union dues; a scheme which already places our militants partly outside the federal union apparatus in any case since many of us have been prevented from joining as a result of the party's refusal to participate.

The economic crisis of the mid-seventies accelerated this process. In addition to adopting a policy of making “sacrifices”, the restrictive mesh of the CGIL organization became ever more narrow and resistant to any class influence, until eventually it would reach a stage where episodes of struggle which stood opposed to the policy of union collaboration were increasingly forced to rely on the organisation of workers outside the union confederation, which responded by doing everything in its power to sabotage such struggles. The CGIL became ever more inaccessible, even in the base and factory organisations. Today a point has been reached where the union's platform of demands, and its deals with the bosses, are not even submitted to assemblies of workers for their approval. Every decision now takes place in a sphere from which the workers are totally excluded.

The federal union, having now arrived at a stage where it even endorses anti-strike laws, has become an organization separated from and opposed to the working masses; it is a body of paid functionaries whose purpose is to allow any attack by capital to succeed whilst at the same time clamping down on any workers' reaction. The workers are denied access to this apparatus – apart from the small minority which is prepared, normally for personal gain, to sell out and embrace its political positions.

Given this state of affairs, it would be impractical, and would cause confusion within the class, if communists were to work in such organisations with the aim of simply replacing the “corrupt” leaders who “had sold out”, or seeking to win them back to class politics. For quite a while there haven't been any branches within the union in which the party could conduct its battle in any case. All ways are barred to us, even if we did wade in brandishing our membership cards and with lots of workers supporting us.

Certainly, in order to get our point of view across, we still take part in demonstrations, strikes, and those occasional workers' assemblies which are still called by the union, but that doesn't mean to say we are “working in the union”.

In any case, since the end of the seventies, it is noticeable that any attempt by the workers to move in a direction opposed to the politics of collaboration has been expressed through organisations which are outside, and opposed to, the federal union. The COBAS's (Base Committees – see article 'The Party and the COBAS's' in Communist Left N°. 1) express this tendency, whilst the “Internal opposition” within the CGIL, on the other hand, has revealed itself to be a cover-up attempt; a means of betraying and reintegrating malcontents.

Lenin used the term “reactionary unions” to refer to organisations which although still belonging to the working class were led by corrupt and mercenary leaders. In such organisations, it is possible, in fact indispensable, for communists to repudiate the actions of the leadership and to win them back to class policies and accepting the leadership of the party. Today in Italy we are confronted with “regime unions”, which even if they haven't formally declared themselves as “State unions,” as happened under the fascist regime, they are however, by now, intimately integrated into the institutional apparatus of capitalist power. No longer do they belong to the working class. They are closed and impenetrable structures, just like all the regime's institutions in which we find the workers “enrolled” but not organised. They are of no use to the working class.

From this derives our recognition of the impossibility of working inside the regime union with a view to making it susceptible to class politics. Hence our formulation of the necessity to reconstitute the class union “ex-novo”, outside and against it.

Although there are rumblings of discontent, the majority of workers still continue to follow the non-directives of these unions, and the need to abandon them in order to reconstitute the classist union has not yet been widely expressed. And yet the Party has the duty of anticipating this necessity.

We also predict that, when faced with strong pressure from the workers, these unions will discover the necessity of appearing to back large-scale struggles and even lead them on occasions when they have been unable to restrain, isolate, or repress their most combative elements. The regime union in these cases can carry out its function by placing itself at the head of the movement and voicing some of its demands, but only so as to be able to try and control it, circumscribe it, deflect it and bring about its defeat. The alternative – of abandoning the struggle to its own devices – could result in dire consequences for the regime. There is the case, for example, of the magnificent strike against the sackings of FIAT workers in 1980, which was rock solid for a whole month until stabbed in the back by the CGIL.

It is therefore the party's duty, at such times, to indicate the need for an organisation which is independent from the regime union as the means of conducting the struggle, and as the fundamental lesson which needs to be drawn.

We emphasize that such considerations are made with Italy in mind, where the party has a long history of participating in trade union activity and testing its conclusions, and we appreciate that to better understand the trade union situation in other countries (where we exist however in very small numbers) we will need to undertake a much more thorough study. Such study will be a determining factor as to how we further refine our formulations in the matter of union tactics. It will need to examine the history of the trade union organisations up to the present day, defining how they are organised and structured, how they are organised in the factories and at higher levels; the links with political parties, the politics which influence them and the degree to which they are incorporated into the State apparatus. We will need to find out about the tendencies within them and about any potential opposition to the policies of the leading groups, and whether there is any real possibility that rank-and-file organizations may become susceptible to class action.

Another issue we regard as important is pinning down the definition of a “class union”. This is aimed at those who would like to reduce the problem to purely a question of organisational forms. There are many who maintain, for instance, that “rank-and-file democracy” is the new starting off point, since the abandonment of democratic consultation with the workers is the reason for the degeneration of the trade unions. Equally they disapprove of the fact that a well-paid body of union officials who have escaped from the factory floor have replaced voluntary worker activists.

It is certainly true that that the regime union is structured in such a way as to prevent itself being subordinated, but on the contrary to systematically impose its will on the class and bring its anti-worker policies to bear. Nevertheless, even in the class union, “rank-and-file democracy” is a fetish which will have to be subordinated to the necessity for well-timed and unified actions by the entire movement. The class line and class action has to be defended against corporativist and reactionary pressures, and these will inevitably crop up amongst the “rank- and-file” as well. Whilst it is true that the regime union is inevitably based on an apparatus of well-paid, corrupt officials, the class union, though based on voluntary activity, will require, in a large and centralized organization, full-time and therefore paid officials.

Another point. It isn't up to us, or anyone else, to go in search of new organisational forms in the belief that it is the key to resolving the problem of the reconstitution of the class union. Although in a phase of recovery the class might express organisational forms which differ from the traditional, it is highly unlikely today. The organizations which the workers have been forming outside the official unions in Italy, the COBAS's, and similar ones elsewhere, are therefore the object of our interest not because they are the manifestations of “original” forms of workers' organizations, but because they are the expression of the tendency to reorganize against the collaborationist politics of the old unions.

What we are anticipating is the need for a return to class politics and class action by organisations of a purely economic character composed of wage-earners alone, structured in a centralised way in order to ensure unitary action for the movement, based on factory organizations, but also territorial organizations which transcend the local and craft based nature of the factory.

These last points we will return to in a subsequent article.